Craig Colby v. Karen Gunson, State Medical Examiner (SC S057691) (August 26, 2010)
Excerpt (from August 26, 2010, OJD Media Release):
“On review from the Court of Appeals in an appeal from the Marion County Circuit Court, Albin W. Norblad, Judge. 229 Or App 167, 210 P3d 917 (2009).
I’m an energetic advocate of DIY Legal Research (as are most public law library librarians) and a somewhat less than enthusiastic advocate of DIY Lawyering (aka self-help, self-representation, pro se litigation, pro per representation), especially for people who don’t have any research experience or aptitude for hours of study, note-taking, writing, preparation, decision-making, and the sense to consult experts when necessary (not to mention having the patience of a cat watching its prey).
I’ve learned over the years that the most successful self-help litigant isn’t necessarily the smartest person, though “smart” can help. But persistence, attention to detail, listening, patience, and good manners can often win out over “smart.”
Our best pro se litigants consult attorneys. The litigants save money by thorough research, study, observation, taking chances and making mistakes, and not a small amount of luck. They also have lots of energy that is used staying up late drafting motions, answers, letters, and reading the law, in all its procedural and substantive glory.
Can a self-represented (pro se) litigant claim “attorneys fees?”
For a discussion of the meaning of attorneys fees in the context of a pro se litigant’s public records lawsuit, I recommend you read the recently decided (June 17) Colby v. Gunson (A133979) (2009).
Excerpt: “Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to attorney fees and costs under ORS 192.490(3) because he is a “person seeking the right to inspect” public records, and he prevailed in the appeal. Defendant contends that the statutory reference to “attorney fees” includes only fees that are charged to a client under a contractual commitment between an attorney and client and not the value of the time invested in the case by a self-represented client. Our determination of the intended meaning of the term “attorney fees” in ORS 192.490(3) is governed by the method described in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), as recently modified by State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, ___ P3d ___ (2009) (examination of the text and context of the statute, and legislative history of the enactment when that history appears useful to the court’s analysis)….
…
ORS 192.409(3) does not require that the attorney fees be “incurred.” The statutory construction issue in this case, then, is whether the bare term “attorney fees” implies that same contractual dynamic–a charge by an attorney that a separate entity is obligated to pay. We determine the legislative intent in the use of particular statutory wording by giving words their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. Haynes v. Tri-County Metro., 337 Or 659, 663, 103 P3d 101 (2004). In common parlance, “attorney fee” connotes a charge for an attorney’s professional services. Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 833 (unabridged ed 2002) defines “fee” to include “compensation often in the form of a fixed charge for professional service or for special and requested exercise of talent or of skill (as by an artist) (a doctor’s ~) (a lawyer’s retainer ~).” Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary 139 (8th ed 2004) defines “attorney fee” as “[t]he charge to a client for services performed for the client, such as an hourly fee, a flat fee, or a contingent fee.” A “charge,” in turn, arises in a transaction between two persons. Webster’s defines “charge” to mean:…” (read full case!)
A letter by attorney Frederic Cann in the October 2007 OSB Bulletin makes several important points about attorney ghostwriting, the subject of a July 2007 OSB Bulletin article, “The Ethics of Unbundling.”
Here’s an excerpt from the letter:
“The past few years have seen many articles in the OSB Bulletin about ‘unbundling’ legal services. In the consumer law area the expense of full-service legal representation means unbundled legal services are here to stay. However, lawyers providing unbundled legal services in litigation do have to navigate a “minefield,” because they often are unable to control the ultimate use or presentation of their work product.
See this Oregon Court of Appeals case, State v Rowe, Docket no. A128400. From the OJD Media Release page (use drop-down menu to get to the Ct of App):
“Defendant appeals his convictions for impeding traffic, ORS 811.130, and failure to obey a police officer, ORS 811.535. Defendant was standing next to his bicycle on a sidewalk in Portland when he refused a police officer’s order to “move along.” Held: To be convicted of impeding traffic, defendant had to have been “riding a bicycle.” To be convicted of failure to obey, the officer’s order had to have been lawful. On appeal, the state concedes that it failed to prove that defendant was riding a bicycle. Further, the state concedes that no other lawful basis existed for the officer to have ordered defendant to move. Reversed.”
Oregon Legal Research Blog