State of Oregon v. John Elwood Causey, Jr., A148112, 265 Or App __ (2014) (Multnomah County Circuit Court, 100646533)
Excerpt from case:
“DE MUNIZ, S. J.
State of Oregon v. John Elwood Causey, Jr., A148112, 265 Or App __ (2014) (Multnomah County Circuit Court, 100646533)
Excerpt from case:
“DE MUNIZ, S. J.
“The Oregon Innocence Project (OIP) is a joint project of the Oregon Justice Resource Center (an independent nonprofit based out of Lewis & Clark Law School) and Metropolitan Public Defender whose mission is to (1) exonerate the innocent, (2) educate and train law students, and (3) promote legal reforms aimed at preventing wrongful convictions….” [Link to the OIP.]
The Oregon Innocence Project Launch and Benefit Party, April 9, 2014
From University of Washington’s Trial Advocacy blog: Crime Stats and Google (NYT)
Excerpt from blog post: “An economist has been mining Google search data to learn more about crime, particularly for crimes that are underreported. Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, How Googling Unmasks Child Abuse, N.Y. Times, July 13, 2013….” [Link to full blog post.]
Last Friday, May 31st, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled on a DUII case involving “sleep driving” (State of Oregon v. James Robert Newman). In an unexpected move, the Court reversed the drunk driving conviction of a Portland man who claimed he was “sleep driving” when he was arrested. Newman admitted to drinking on the evening in question, but did not admit to voluntarily driving; as his arrest occurred after he had a friend drive him home and retired for the evening.
According to the May 31, 2013 Supreme Court media release, the Court held that a “defendant must commit a voluntary act with respect to the driving element of DUII to be convicted of that offense,” and thus the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant to introduce evidence that he was “sleep driving.” The Supreme Court ruled that the statute on requirements for criminal liability (ORS 191.095(1)) applies to DUII. ORS 191.095(1) reads: “The minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which the person is capable of performing.” In constructing its opinion, the Court found legislative intent to “exclude from the definition of voluntary acts any acts that are taken when a person is sleeping” (p. 12).
The June 1 Oregonian article on the case notes the unanimous decision is sending “shock waves” through the state’s prosecutorial community. The article indicates the Court’s ruling shows prosecutors must now prove DUII defendants were voluntarily driving when they were arrested. The article also mentions the Oregon Department of Justice may try to work with legislators before the end of the current session to ensure involuntary driving doesn’t remain as a DUII defense.
“Post-Conviction Representation, Pro Se Practice and Access to the Courts,” by Ken Strutin, published at LLRX dot com on February 19, 2013
Excerpt: “After the first criminal appeal, there is no constitutional right to counsel. Thus, the convicted and imprisoned pursuing discretionary appeals and habeas corpus relief must research, investigate and litigate as their own attorney. A body of law has developed that defines the spectrum between full-blown post-conviction representation and the impact of the conditions of confinement on pro se litigants….” [Link to full 2/19/13 LLRX article.]
beSpacific has links to:
“National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction”
and links to lots and lots of other great stuff for the policy wonk.
The OJD December 10, 2009, Media Release gives a summary of this case (other Media Releases).
Read the full case:
State of Oregon v. Roy Lee McCullough, Jr. (SC S056910) (decided December 10, 2009)
The Oregon Supreme Court case that limited mandatory measure 11 sentences and that garnered a lot of headlines and commentary in September, was:
STATE OF OREGON v. RODRIGUEZ / BUCK (SC S055720), filed September 24, 2009:
The decisions of the Court of Appeals are affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgments of the circuit courts are affirmed.